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In June of 1976, a federal grand jury returned a twelve count
indictment against United States Congressman Henry Helstoski on
charges of soliciting and receiving bribes in return for the introduction of private immigration bills on the floor of the House of Representatives.'
Prior to his trial, Helstoski moved in federal district
court to strike the first four counts of the indictment. 2 The Con-

' United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 513 (3d Cir. 1978). The indictments were the
result of investigations by several federal grand juries in New Jersey examining allegations of
political corruption and fraudulent immigration practices. Id. At the time of the indictment, as
well as during the time covered by the indictment, the defendant was a member of Congress
representing New Jersey's Ninth Congressional District. Id. The Congressman's introduction of
private bills, as distinguished from public statutes affecting the community at large, were limited in operation and effect to particular individuals. For a definition of private bills, see BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 991 (3d ed. 1969).
2 United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 514 (3d Cir. 1978); Brief and Appendix for

Petitioner at 9, United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Petitioner]. Prior to Helstoski's motion to dismiss, the trial judge had severed Counts
VII through X of the twelve count indictment for later disposition. The severed counts named
Helstoski along with several codefendants, whereas the remaining eight counts involved only
Helstoski. United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at I n.1 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977)
(unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978). Count I of the indictment charged
Helstoski with violation of the conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1966), it being alleged that,
while a member of Congress, "the defendant conspired to violate the official bribery statute, 18
U.S.C. § 201 (c)(1) (1969), by acting with others to solicit and obtain bribes from resident aliens
in return for being influenced in the performance of official acts to benefit those aliens." 576
F.2d at 513 (footnote omitted). The latter statute provides in pertinent part:
(c) Whoever, being a public official or person selected to be a public official,
directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or
entity, in return for:
or (1) being influenced in his performance of any official act;
(2) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow,
any fraud . . . on the United States;
shall be fined . . . or imprisoned ....

18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1),(2) (1969).
Counts II through IV of the indictment charged Helstoski with substantive bribery offenses. These counts alleged that Helstoski actually sought or accepted bribes in return for his
being influenced to introduce private immigration bills. 576 F.2d at 513. Each of Counts I
through IV alleged specific names and dates. For example, Count IV charged that:
"on or about January 11, 1975 ... the defendant, HENRY HELSTOSKI, . . . corruptly . . . solicited . . . and agreed to receive cash payments from Luis and Maria

Echavarria in return for his being influenced in the performance of an official act, to
wit: the introduction of a second private bill in the United States House of Rep-
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gressman contended that each of the counts in question was based on
allegations of specific legislative acts performed by him in his official
capacity, thereby violating the speech or debate clause of the United
States Constitution. 3 The Government maintained that Helstoski had
waived his rights under the clause by voluntarily testifying about his
legislative activities before a grand jury4 and at the trial of his alleged
5
co-conspirator.
In an unpublished opinion upholding the validity of Counts I
through IV, United States District Court Judge H. Curtis Meanor
rejected Helstoski's initial contention that the indictment warranted
dismissal since the grand jurors had heard impermissible evidence
concerning the Congressman's legislative acts. 6 Furthermore, Judge
Meanor held that reference in the indictment to Helstoski's official
activities did not render the indictment invalid since a prima facie
showing of culpability could be made without inquiry into the
defendant's legislative performance. 7 In rejecting the Government's
resentatives on behalf of Luis and Maria Echavarria, which private bill was introduced by the defendant, HENRY HELSTOSKI, on January 27, 1975."
Id. (quoting the indictment).
' United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 512 (3d Cir. 1978), The Constitution provides
that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they [senators and representatives] shall not be
questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
4 United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 514 (3d Cir. 1978). A number of grand juries,
over a period of several years prior to the defendant's indictment, had investigated corruption in
immigration matters. As a result of these inquiries, Helstoski's brother, as well as an administrative aide, were convicted of political corruption and fraud. Id. at 513. Helstoski cooperated fully
during the investigations by testifying freely about the immigration bills he had introduced in
the House, and by producing numerous documents relating to the bills. Id. at 514. On a May
7th grand jury appearance, after the Congressman was informed that his inquiry regarding
whether he was a target of the grand jury's investigation was "inappropriate," Helstoski provided no further documents for the grand jury. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 7. During
Helstoski's last grand jury appearance on May 14, 1976, he invoked his speech or debate
privilege and refused to answer further questions. 576 F.2d at 513-14.
Before each grand jury appearance, Helstoski was warned of possible self-incrimination and
advised of his right to counsel. Though he was not reminded of his speech or debate privilege,
the district court found it reasonable to assume that the defendant was aware of his right since
he had used it as a defense in a prior suit involving his franking privilege. Id. at 514 n.3; see
Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 492 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1974).
5 United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 514 (3d Cir. 1978). At the trial of his former
aide, Albert DeFalco, Helstoski testified and produced documents relating to his own introduction of private immigration bills. Id.
6 United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 3, 4 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978). Judge Meanor determined that once a grand
jury indictment is obtained "'by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury,"' a court will not
look beyond the face of the indictment to test the validity of the evidence. Id. at 4 (quoting
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 356, 363 (1956)). Were challenges routinely permitted, the
result would be a "preliminary trial of the validity of the indictment," causing "impermissible
delays in reaching the merits of criminal cases." Id.
I United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 8 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished
opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
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waiver argument, the court held that a waiver may not be found by
implication, but must be express and "for the precise purpose for
which the Government seeks to use evidence of legislative acts." 8
The court concluded by barring the Government from using, during
its case-in-chief, any evidence of Helstoski's past performance of his
legislative activities. 9
An interlocutory appeal was filed by the Government challenging
the district court's exclusion of all evidence referring to prior legislative activities. 10 Helstoski, meanwhile, sought to compel the district
court's dismissal of Counts I through IV of the indictment by petitioning for a writ of mandamus. 1 1 Both cases were consolidated for dis12
position on the merits.

a United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 16 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
9 United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 19 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978). Judge Meanor included within his prohibition "evidence, derived from any source and for any purpose." Id.
50 United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 513 (3d Cir. 1978). The Government's appeal
was filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (West Cum. Supp. 1978), which reads ih pertinent part:
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or
order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence . . . not made after the
defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that
the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial
proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
At an in camera pretrial conference held on February 1, 1977, Judge Meanor informed the
parties of his decision to deny the defendant's motion for dismissal of the indictment, but to bar
proof of his legislative acts at trial. Additionally, the judge announced that he had rejected the
Government's waiver argument. 576 F.2d at 514. At that time, the Government informed the
court of its intent to take an interlocutory appeal and requested an oral argument, which was
subsequently scheduled for February 14. United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 3
n.3 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
At oral argument, the government asked for a determination of the admissibility of twentythree categories of evidence. The district court refused to rule specifically on each of the
categories, but reiterated in a written opinion of February 22 its absolute prohibition of "the
introduction into evidence of legislative acts for any purpose." 576 F.2d at 515. An interlocutory
appeal was then filed by the Government on March 18, 1977. Brief for Appellant at 3, United
States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
" United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 512 (3d Cir. 1978). Helstoski argued that he
was entitled to a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1966) (All Writs Act). Initially
he claimed that since the wording of the first four counts of the indictment mentioned specific
legislative acts, the proof of such acts would violate his speech or debate privilege. Id. at 516.
Secondly, the Congressman alleged that the district court's ban on the Government's introduction of past legislative acts modified the proof of an essential element of the crime, and thus
constituted a " 'constructive amendment' " of the indictment. Id. at 518. According to the
defendant, this modification effectively deprived him of his fifth amendment right to be indicted
solely by a grand jury. Id. Finally, Helstoski maintained that the district court lacked jurisdiction to try the indictment because the grand jury used evidence which was violative of his
legislative privilege. Id.
12 United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 515 (3d Cir. 1978).
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In United States v. Helstoski,' 3 Chief Judge Seitz, writing for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirmed the
district court's findings on all major issues.' 4 Although it acknowleged its jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus, the court of appeals
denied the petition in Helstoski's case, finding that the Congressman
had fAiled to make a "sufficient showing to justify issuance of the writ
. .on
o Speech or Debate grounds." 15 In upholding the indictment's
validity, the court indicated that a prima facie case could be established without any reference to protected legislative acts, 6 and that it
would not countenance a challenge to the competency of the evidence presented to a grand jury. 1 7 Furthermore, the lower court's
evidentiary ruling was held not to constitute a " 'constructive amendment' " of the indictment since it did not result in altering the
8
proof of any fundamental elements of the crime.'
Upon determining that it had jurisdiction to hear the Government's appeal, 19 the Third Circuit reiterated the district court's unequivocal ban on the introduction of legislative acts, whether through
the use of secondary materials such as correspondence and state20
ments, or for the subsidiary purpose of proving motive or intent.
Despite the court's refusal to decide whether a legislator may waive
his speech or debate privilege, Judge Seitz found that under the facts
in this case Helstoski had not expressly waived the privilege in com2
pliance with the strict standards required for a criminal prosecution. '

13 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
14 Id. at 524.

15 Id. at 517. For a discussion of the basis of Helstoski's petition for a writ of mandamus, see
note 11 supra.
16 576 F.2d at 517.
17 Id. at 519.
18 Id. at 518.

19 Id. at 521. The defendant had challenged the court's jurisdiction to hear the Government's appeal based on his literal reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). See
note 10 supra. While Helstoski argued that the lower court's order did not actually "suppress or
exclude any specific items of evidence," the court of appeals noted jurisdiction, recognizing that
the order essentially constituted an evidentiary ruling, and that Congress intended section 3731
be construed broadly. Id. at 520-21.
20 See 576 F.2d at 522.
21 Id. at 523-24. To support his upholding of an express waiver standard, Judge Seitz indicated the need for preserving legislative independence. He suggested that any lesser standard
would allow for executive and judicial encroachment which would inevitably undermine "'the
integrity of the legislative process.' " Id. at 523 (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S.
501, 507 (1972)).
The Government petitioned for a rehearing en banc, but its request was denied. It subsequently took an appeal on the evidentiary ruling to the United States Supreme Court, which
resulted in the Court's granting a writ of certiorari. United States v. Helstoski, 47 U.S.L.W.
3401 (1978).

NOTES

1978]

The concept of a legislative speech or debate privilege is based
upon the belief that for the effective operation of a representative
form of government, a legislator must be able to freely speak out
when exercising his governmental functions without fear of punishment or reprisal. 22 The origins of the American privilege can be
traced to the passage, in 1689, of the English Bill of Rights containing
the speech or debate privilege. 2 3 This event marked the culmination
of a difficult struggle by Parliament for independence and supremacy
over the monarchy.2 4 The American colonists, cognizant of the English experience, modeled their colonial assemblies after Parliament, 25 and later included speech or debate clauses in most state
constitutions, 2 6 as well as in the Articles of Confederation. 2 7 By
1789, the unopposed adoption of the speech or debate clause by the

22 See C. WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE

12-32

(1970). The author noted that "[p]arliamentary government has been described as 'government
by talking.' " Id. at 23.
23 The relevant portion provides *'[t]hat the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of
Parliament." 1 W. & M. SESS. 2, c.2 (1688).
24 See C. WITTKE, supra note 22, at 23-30. When three members of Parliament were tried
by the Court of the Kings Bench for "libellous and seditious" speeches, they challenged that
court's jurisdiction, insisting that only Parliament had the right to try and punish them if any
offense had, in fact, been committed. The accused maintained that " '[w]ords spoken in Parliament, which is a superior court, cannot be questioned in this court, which is inferior.' " Id. at
29 (quoting 3 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS 296). The defendants were imprisoned and fined, but
this unpopular decision only served to increase the growing ill-feeling toward Charles I. Id. at
30.
25 M. CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 14-15 (1943). The
former Englishmen, well aware of the powers and privileges of Parliament, patterned their
colonial assemblies after the English legislative system. As a result, these assemblies were often
referred to as "parliaments." Id. See also D. HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 69 (1975). Though more restricted in their powers than Parliament, the colonial
assemblies were still mindful of legislative privilege and did manage to exercise this right. Celia,
The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and
Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutionsin the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 3-16 (1968).
Actually, these assemblies were more analogous to Parliament than they were to the state legislatures which followed, especially regarding the exercise of judicial authority. See M. CLARKE,
supra at 15-23.
26 See Celia, supra note 25, at 14 & n.38. The speech or debate clause in the Massachusetts
constitution provided that:
The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the legislature,
is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any
accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.
MASS. CONST. art. XXI (1780). See also N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX (1784).
27 The clause extending legislative privilege provides that "[freedom of speech and debate in
Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress .
ART. OF CONFED.,

art. V.
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framers of the Constitution reflected the firmly rooted tradition of
legislative privilege in American law.2 8
Although in both nations the constitutional framers acted "to
prevent [a legislator's] intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary," 29 the historical and political
30
differences between the two countries preclude further analogies.
Whereas the English Parliament's tribunal origins enabled it to claim
its judicial functions by inheritance, the American Congress was empowered solely with legislative functions, coequal and coordinate with
the judicial and executive branches. 3 1 Consequently, the scope of
the American privilege is narrower, 32 thus precluding legislative intrusion upon the judiciary's constitutionally granted sphere of authority, 33 while the English political system is not similarly circumscribed
34
by the doctrine of separation of powers.
Two important issues in the Helstoski case-the scope of the
protections afforded by the speech or debate clause and whether
those protections can be waived-have received infrequent attention
by the courts. In 1808, Coffin v. Coffin 35 marked the first occasion in
this country that a court was required to construe a speech or debate

28

See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966). The absence of any recorded

debate prior to the passage of article I, section 6 indicates the lack of resistance to its adoption.
II RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 246 (Farrand ed. 1911).
29 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966). James Wilson, a prominent member
of the Constitutional Convention's Committee of Detail and later a United States Supreme
Court Justice, stated that the purpose of the speech or debate clause was
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success . . . [so] that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and . . . be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful,
to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence.
II THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (Andrews ed. 1896); see J. STORY, ExPOSITION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 144, at 94 (1878).
3' C. WITTKE, supra note 22, at 12-14. Originally Parliament had exercised executive,
legislative and judicial duties simultaneously. Although Parliament's judicial functions have di-

minished, its present jurisdiction to try and punish a member originated from its historic inherent powers as a body with judicial functions. While much of Parliament's judicial power has
been divested by statute and usage, there remain occasions when a member may invoke its
judicial origins. Id. at 183-87.
31 See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517-19 (1972); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 189 (1881); C. WITTKE, supra note 22, at 182-83; Cella, supra note 25, at 15.
32 Cella, supra note 25, at 15. For example, Parliament may imprison for contempt anyone
who has violated its speech or debate privilege, and this decision is not reviewable by any other
court. Congress, on the other hand, may only cite an offender for contempt if there has been a
serious interference with the legislative process; however, this proceeding is always reviewable
by the judiciary. Id.
'3 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192-93 (1881).
34 See Cella, supra note 25, at 15.
35 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
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clause. The case involved a slander suit brought by William Coffin
against a Massachusetts state legislator, Micajah Coffin, for defamatory remarks uttered within the chambers of the state house in the
presence of several individuals. 3 6 On ultimate appeal, the Massachusetts supreme court held that Micajah Coffin's slanderous words
were not spoken while "executing the duties of his office," 3 7 and thus
38
were not within the protection of the privilege.
The Coffin court characterized a communication as privileged if
the words were spoken while the legislator was discharging an act of
office, but not if he was acting as a private citizen. 39 This privilege
has been constitutionally granted by the people to "each individual
member" of the state house 40 for the express purpose of providing
citizens with independent legislators who could function in office
without the threat of prosecution. 4 1 Since the legislative privilege
was not retained by the house as an entity, the court held that a

36 Id.

at 3-4. The event in question occurred after Representative Russell offered a resolu-

tion authorizing an additional notary public for Nantucket. Id. at 2-3. When asked by the
defendant, Representative Micajah Coffin, where he had obtained his facts in support of the
resolution, Russell responded that it "came from a respectable gentleman from Nantucket." Id.
at 4 (emphasis omitted). Russell was in fact referring to William Coffin, who had been earlier
accused and acquitted of robbing the Nantucket Bank. Id. at 2. After the resolution had passed,
Coffin approached Russell in the passage-way of the chamber, and upon learning that the gentleman was William Coffin exclaimed, " 'What, that convict?' " Id. (emphasis omitted). When
informed of Coffin's acquittal, he remarked, "'That did not make him the less guilty ....
' Id.
at 4 (emphasis omitted).
37 Id. at 29-30. The defendant was found to have engaged in an ordinary conversation which
was unrelated to his legislative activities. Additionally, the statements were not intended to
serve an informational purpose. Id.
38 Id. at 30.
39 Id. The court noted that if malicious or defamatory words were spoken in performance of
an official duty, a legislator would be protected by the privilege. Id. at 30-31. The court further
suggested in dicta that a functional, rather than a mechanical approach be used to determine
whether the utterance was related to an official act. In deciding that legislative activities were
not necessarily limited to occasions when a member remains at his chair, stands within the

house chamber, or acts according to the rules, the court sought to include only those "act[s]
resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the office .. .." Id. at 27. By the same
token, however, the court refused to include within the scope of protected activity
every malicious slander, uttered by a citizen, who is a representative, as within his
privilege, because it was uttered in the walls of the representatives' chamber to
another member, but not uttered in executing his official duty, [for that] would . ..
extend the privilege farther than was intended by the people ....
Id. at 31.
40 Id. at 27. The court declared that "the will of the people, expressed in the constitution
• .. is paramount to the will of either or both branches of the legislature." Id.
" Id. The grant of privilege, however, was not so broad that a legislator could invoke it for
his own benefit to avoid prosecutions as a private citizen. Id.
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member's privilege might not be waived or otherwise deprived by
42
that body.
The Massachusetts supreme court's broad interpretation of the
scope of legislative activity defined by a speech or debate clause has
served as a model in subsequent cases tried in federal courts.4 3 Seventy years after the Coffin decision, Kilbourn v. Thompson 44 arose as
a case of first impression for a federal court under the federal constitutional clause. Kilbourn brought an action for false imprisonment
against Thompson, sergeant-at-arms of the House of Representatives,
and several members of a congressional committee after they had
held him in contempt and ordered his imprisonment for refusal to
testify before the committee. 4 5 Although the Supreme Court held
that the Constitution does not grant Congress the power to punish for
contempt, 46 it found the individual representatives' activities to be
protected by legislative privilege and, therefore, not subject to
suit. 4 7 Thus, the permissible scope of legislative activities subject to
the privilege included all those "things generally done in a session of
the House by one of its members in relation to the business before
it."

48

A seventy year time span again elapsed before another case involving legislative privilege came before the Supreme Court. In Tenney v. Brandhove,4 9 plaintiff Brandhove sued members of the
California Senate Committee on Un-American Activities for damages,
alleging that they had deprived him of his civil rights during a committee hearing. 50 The Supreme Court ultimately found that the in-

42 Id. at 27. The court's position on waiver was apparently dicta since the narrow question
before the court was whether Coffin's words were spoken in execution of his official duty. Id. at
29.

Following the Coffin court's analysis, the issue of waiver was not explored again until quite
recently in United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of the Craig

court's concept of waiver, see text accompanying notes 108-12 infra. For a statement of the
Helstoski court's analysis of waiver, see text accompanying notes 140-45 infra.
43 See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 203 (1881).
- 103 U.S. 168 (1881). The Kilbourn Court attached great weight to the Coffin opinion,
primarily because it was delivered soon after the writing of the Constitution, and due to the
absence of any prior federal decisions dealing with the speech or debate clause. Id. at 204.
45 Id. at 170-71.
46 Id. at 182. •
47 Id. at 204-05.
48 Id. at 204.
49 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
a0 Id. at 371. Brandhove was summoned before the Tenney Committee in order to resolve
inconsistencies between accusations contained in a petition circulated by Tenney among members of the California Legislature, and evidence previously given before the Committee. Al-
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vestigation and hearings were within the sphere of legislative activity
and, consequently, were immune from suit. 5 ' While reiterating Coffin's broad approach, the Court contributed to the developing caselaw by its pronouncement that "[t]he claim of an unworthy purpose
does not destroy the privilege." 52 Accordingly, neither a legislator's
official actions nor his underlying motivations could be subject to a
53
probe by the courts.
The Supreme Court continued its tradition of liberally interpreting the scope of the speech or debate privilege in United States v.
Johnson.5 4 There the Court confronted the issue of whether' a congressman who was accused of criminal conspiracy for accepting a
bribe to deliver a speech in the House might have the contents of
that speech, 55 as well as his motives for giving it, 56 introduced as
evidence at his trial. Congressman Johnson and his three codefendants were found guilty of having conspired to pressure the Department of Justice to dismiss indictments against a Maryland savings
and loan company and its officers. 5 7 As part of the conspiracy,
Johnson was charged with having read a speech on the floor of the
House which was favorable to savings and loan institutions. 5 8 It was
alleged that a particular savings bank subsequently had distributed
copies of his speech to dispel any suspicions held by potential customers of improper management. 5 9 The Fourth Circuit reversed the
trial court's finding of guilt on the conspiracy charge, dismissed that
60
entire charge, and ordered a new trial on the other counts.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court initially noted a lack of precedent for interpreting legislative privilege in

though Brandhove refused to testify, his earlier testimony was quoted by the chairman, a statement was read regarding his alleged criminal record, and a newspaper article denying the truth
of his accusations was entered into the record of the proceeding. As a result of this incident,
Brandhove charged that the hearing had served no legitimate legislative purpose, but was only
intended to intimidate and deprive him of his right of free speech. Id. at 370-71.
51 Id.

at 377-78.
52 id. at 377.

53 See id.at 379.
383 U.S. 169 (1966).
55 Id. at 173-76. The defendant was questioned extensively at trial about the wording, authorship, and general preparation of the speech. Id. & nn.4-5, 7.
51 Id. at 176. In order to prove its conspiracy charge, the Government introduced evidence
at trial tending to show that Johnson's purpose in making the speech was to serve his seLfinterest rather than to fulfill a proper governmental purpose. Id. at 177.
57 Id. at 170-71.

58 Id. at 171-72.
59 Id. at 172.

60 Id. at 171. The appellate court found that the entire trial had been "infected" by the
admission of unconstitutional evidence under the conspiracy count. Id.
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the context of a criminal prosecution. 6 ' The Court indicated, however, that the speech or debate clause had arisen historically, not in
the context of private litigation, "but rather to prevent intimidation
by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile
judiciary," 62 thus serving as a protection against prosecutions by the
63
English monarchy.
The Court refused to limit the reach of the speech or debate
clause to only civil suits. 64 Consequently, it precluded the prosecution in a criminal action from inquiring into "the manner of preparation and the precise ingredients of the speech," 65 or from delving
into the motivations of a congressman for delivering the speech. 66
While upholding the validity of the conspiracy charge, the Court ordered a new trial, purged of all reference to Johnson's legislative acts
67
or motives.
In contrast to a nearly two hundred year time span in which the
only three cases involving the speech or debate privilege to reach the
Supreme Court 6 8 were broadly construed, 6 9 1972 marked the year
that the Burger Court reviewed two speech or debate cases, narrowly
interpreting the scope of the clause in both. 70 The first case, United
States v. Brewster, 71 involved a former senator who was indicted for
61 Id. at 179-80. The limited number of prior cases involving the speech or debate clause
were restricted to civil suits. See, e.g., Tenney, 341 U.S. at 369 (suit against state legislator for
depriving citizen of his civil rights); Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 170 (several members of Congress
sued for false imprisonment).
62 383 U.S. at 181.

3 Id. at 180-81.
6 Id. at 184-85.
6A Id. at 175-76.
66 Id. at 177. The Court pointed out that calling into question a congressman's motives for
delivering a speech would naturally result in a defense involving close scrutiny of legislative
acts, thereby constituting an impermissible infringement of article I, section 6. Id.
67 Id. at 185. The Supreme Court reinstated the conspiracy count originally dismissed by
the court of appeals, but affirmed that court's ruling which barred all use of the tainted evidence. Id.
The Johnson Court confined its holding to these facts and specifically refused to rule on
whether Congress, through a narrowly drawn statute, may allow for judicial inquiry into a legislator's official acts and motives, thereby leaving open the issue of waiver. Id. The question
whether an individual congressman or Congress as a body through a narrowly drawn statute
may waive the speech or debate privilege has never been resolved by the Supreme Court and
remains unanswered by the Helstoski court. See 576 F.2d at 524.
68 See 383 U.S. at 179. According to Justice Harlan, the dearth of cases involving the clause
is explained by the fact that the privilege is "so well established in our polity.
...
Id.
69 For a discussion of the liberal construction given the speech or debate privilege in the
Coffin, Kilbourn and Tenney cases, see notes 43, 48, 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
70 Both United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), and Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606 (1972), were decided on June 29, 1972. For discussions of the Court's narrow interpretation of the clause, see notes 76-85, 97-98 & 102-03 infra and accompanying text.
71 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
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taking a bribe in return for his being influenced to vote and act on
postal rate legislation while a member of the Senate Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service. 72 After the district court dismissed all
of the bribery counts in the indictment, 73 the Government took a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
Although Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, cited the
Johnson Court's opinion barring the introduction at trial of legislative
acts or the motivations for those acts, 74 he confined the scope of
privileged legislative activities to only those which were "clearly a
part of the legislative process." 75 Unprotected by privilege were
many legitimate political services that a congressman might normally
perform for his constituents, 76 in addition to activities that were only
"casually . . . related to legislative affairs but not a part of the legislative process itself.'" 7 7 While noting the broad language used by prior
courts, 78 the Chief Justice indicated that the holdings themselves
79
were not as extensive as the sweeping language of the opinions.
Moreover, "the shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to
preserve the integrity of the legislative process," 8 0 for even in its
most restricted scope the clause has granted an expansive privilege. 8 1
After scrutinizing the wording of the bribery statute and the indictment, 82 the majority concluded that the defendant's crime need
only consist of acceptance of the bribe in return for a promise to act
in a particular way; actual performance of the promised act did not
72 Id. at 502. The counts at issue charged the defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)
(1969). Id. For the text of this provision, see note 2 supra.
73 408 U.S. at 504.

74 Id. at 512.
75Id. at 516.
76 Id.

at 512.

7 Id. at 528. Chief Justice Burger sought to draw a well-defined legislative/political
dichotomy. Other examples of activities deemed not purely legislative in nature were the delivery of a speech outside of Congress or the preparation of a newsletter for constituents. Id. at
512.
78 Id. at 514. The Court cited sections of the Coffin opinion which were quoted with approval in Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 203, and in Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373-74, stating that the
privilege " 'ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally . .. ' " and that it includes " 'every
other act resulting from the nature, and in execution, of the office ......
341 U.S. at 374.
79 408 U.S. at 516.
80 Id. at 517.
81 Id. at 516. The Burger opinion characterized the privilege as "broad enough to insure the
historic independence of the Legislative Branch, . . . but narrow enough to guard against the
excesses of those who would corrupt the process by corrupting its Members." Id. at 525.
82 Id. Four of the counts charged that the defendant "'"corruptly . . . solicited . . . and
agreed to receive' money 'in return for being influenced . . . in respect to his action, vote, and
decision on postage rate legislation which might at any time be pending before him in his
official capacity,' " Id.
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have to be proven. 8 3 Therefore, the Court reasoned that since a
bribe could not possibly be regarded as a legislative act, probing the
purpose of a bribe was permissible, 8 4 regardless of whether in the
course of the inquiry some activities casually related to legislative ac85
tions were examined.
The dissent criticized the majority for not perceiving the issue as
waiver of the legislative privilege.8 6 Properly under consideration,
Justice Brennan argued, was whether Congress could delegate to
another branch of government, by a narrowly drawn bribery statute,
its exclusive constitutionally-granted authority to try its own members
for wrongdoing.8 7 Justice Brennan further criticized the majority
opinion for attempting to speciously distinguish between an inquiry
into the purpose of the illegal agreement, deemed permissible by the
Court, and an inquiry into a legislator's motives, which was considered impermissible. 8 8 Finding "proof of an agreement to be 'influenced' in the performance of legislative acts is by definition an inquiry into their [legislators'] motives," Justice Brennan unequivocally
declared that such an examination was unconstitutional. 89
The Burger Court reinforced its narrow definition of the scope of
legislative privilege in Gravel v. United States, 90 a case which concerned alleged criminal conduct on the part of Senator Gravel and his
aide in acquiring and privately publishing classified information commonly known as the Pentagon Papers. 9 1 Senator Gravel had con83 Id. at 526. To illustrate, a legislator may enter into a corrupt agreement and then default,
not acting in the manner agreed upon; however, proof of the bargain alone will establish a
prima facie case. Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.

at 528.

86 Id. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87 Id. The Constitution provides that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Justice White, in a separate dissent, agreed
that the singular issue facing the Court was a determination of the proper forum for trial of a
congressman. 408 U.S. at 552 (White, J., dissenting). He concluded that permitting Congress,
as a body, to waive its privilege would violate the speech or debate clause of the Constitution.
Id. at 563.
88 Id. at 535-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 536-37. Justice Brennan objected to those counts of the indictment which. charged
a corrupt promise to vote, since it inevitably would involve some inquiry into motives. For
example, count nine charged Senator Brewster with soliciting and receiving a bribe in return for
his action and vote on pending postal rate legislation. Id. at 503. The Justice found this count
clearly violative of the speech or debate clause since it called into question the actual performance of legislative acts, as well as the legislator's reasons for voting. Id. at 535-36 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
90 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
91 Id. at 608. The classified document contained a study of the decision-making process
supporting Viet Nam policy. Id.
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vened a midnight meeting of his subcommittee at which time he read
portions of the Pentagon Papers, placing in the public record all forty
seven volumes. 92 Following press reports that the Senator had arranged for the private publication of the Papers, 93 a grand jury investigating the possible commission of federal crimes subpoenaed one of
his aides, Dr. Rodberg, as a witness. 94 Although Senator Gravel's
motion to quash the subpoena was denied, 9 5 the appellate court ruled
that the aide was shielded from having to testify. 96 On appeal to the
Supreme Court, Justice White held that a Senator's aide was entitled
to the same legislative privilege as his employer. The scope of protection, however, was found not to extend to the acquisition or private
97
publication of the Pentagon Papers.
Justice White reasoned that if activities beyond actual speech or
debate are to be protected, "they must be an integral part of the
deliberative and communicative processes . . . with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation
...
98 Stressing the need for flexibility in applying the clause, particularly in light of the myriad of congressional tasks, the majority
suggested that aides be regarded as congressmen's alter egos, thus
receiving the protective privilege when performing legislative
tasks. 9 9 In order to determine whether Senator Gravel's aide was
required to respond to the subpoena and testify before a grand jury,
Id. at 609.
93 Id. at 609-10. The purported publisher, Beacon Press, a division of the Unitarian Universalist Association, appeared as amicus curiae in support of Senator Gravel's position. Id. at 610
92

n.4.

94 Id. at 608. The crimes under investigation included the
retention of public property or records with intent to convert (18 U.S.C. § 641), the
gathering and transmitting of national defense information (18 U.S.C. § 793), the
concealment or removal of public records or documents (18 U.S.C. § 2071), and
conspiracy to commit such offense and to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C.
§ 371).
Id.
95 Id. at 610-11. Senator Gravel moved to quash the subpoena as an intervenor in the
action against his aide. Id. at 608.
96 Id. at 612. The appellate court held that the speech or debate clause served to foreclose
any inquiry into legislative acts. Private publication of official proceedings, however, did not
come under constitutional protection. The court nevertheless concluded that questioning
Senator Gravel or his aide was barred by a common law privilege analogous to the immunity
which shielded executive officers from liability for news releases containing libelous materials.
Id.
97 Id. at 628.
98 Id. at 625.
9 Id. at 616-17. Recognizing that a congressman could not possibly perform all of his legislative tasks, the Court acknowledged the practical need for staff assistants. Hence, any act which
would have been protected if performed by the congressman is privileged when executed by his
agent. Id.
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the Court was obliged to ascertain whether his testimony would involve disclosure of privileged legislative activities.1 0 0
Applying the criterion it had just established, 1 the majority
excluded from the scope of protected legislative activities both the
acquisition and the private publication of the Pentagon Papers, 10 2 for
inquiry into such matters did not impair the independence of the
Senate and were not an "integral" part of the legislative process.' 0 3 In
contrast, Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion emphasized the vital role
that the congressional informing function played in a representational
form of government, since Congress has a duty to act as a watchdog
over governmental affairs and to disseminate the information it ac04
quires to the public.'
The subject of waiver, although not an issue in Gravel, arose
when the Court attempted to reassure those who feared a possible
repetition of the historical abuses which had permitted members of
Parliament to extend their privilege to others, thereby unjustly relieving third parties of civil or criminal liability. 10 5 Finding this problem
unlikely to occur, the Court noted that the alter ego approach would
allow use of the privilege only by the senator or by an aide on his
behalf, but added that a senator could accordingly waive his aide's
immunity. 10 6 This statement has been subsequently construed to
mean that the speech or debate privilege is a personal one, which can
10 7
only be waived by an individual congressman.
The only case prior to Helstoski which fully addressed the issue
of waivability of congressional immunity was United States v.
100

See id.at 625-27.
101See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
at 625, 628.
103 Id. The Court specifically listed voting, delivering committee reports, and conducting
102 408 U.S.

legislative hearings as protected legislative acts. id. at 624.
104Id. at 639 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas noted Woodrow Wilson's belief that
"'[t]he informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.' - Id.
Furthermore, a well-informed public would help to foster legislative accountability. See id.
105Id. at 621-22. During the 17th and 18th centuries in England, legislative privilege grew
to be grossly abused, since a member's immunity could be expanded to embrace his estate and
servants. Consequently, the ordinary man was deprived of his common law remedies, because
his suit was tried in Parliament without many of the safeguards of the other courts. C. WTTKE,
supra note 22, at 16-17.
1" 408 U.S. at 621-22. Apparently using agency principles, the Court stated that "an aide's
claim of privilege can be repudiated and thus waived by the Senator." Id. at 622 n. 13.
107 United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 11 n.6 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978). Although the Government made this argument in the Helstoski case, Judge Meanor maintained that the Gravel footnote on the issue of
waiver could arguably be interpreted differently. Since the Constitution specifically refers only
to legislators, another standard of waiver may apply to aides who have been granted their
immunity "by judicial gloss" in order to advance the purpose of the clause. Id.
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Craig. 108 In Craig, a state representative, along with two codefendants, was indicted and convicted under a federal statute for
extorting $1500 to block the enactment of a particular bill. 10 9 Two
members of a three judge appellate panel held that Representative
Markert had waived his common law speech or debate privilege by
voluntarily testifying about his legislative acts before a federal grand
jury. 110 Separating the privilege into a "dual protection" serving
both the individual representative and the legislature as a body, the
court theorized "that to the extent the inquiry impugns only the personal independence of the legislator and does not call into question
the independence of other members of the body, the protection of
the speech or debate privilege can be waived.""' Moreover, the
court viewed the personal portion of the immunity, involving only a
legislator's own conduct, as an evidentiary-type privilege requiring a
modified voluntary standard of waiver.112
A concurring opinion was filed in which the judge agreed with
the majority's result," 3 but found it unnecessary to reach the waiver
issue 114 since he believed there could be no common law speech or
debate privilege without first finding an underlying common law official immunity. In the case of a federal criminal prosecution, however,
116
official immunity may not be invoked. 115 On rehearing en banc,
the Seventh Circuit summarily affirmed the concurring opinion of the
108 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
109 Id.

at 774. The defendants were indicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970),

for extorting money from an automotive vehicle leasing firm, and for "inducing the payments
'under color of official right ....'"
150 Id. at 781. The defendant also had claimed protection under the speech or debate clause
of the Illinois Constitution, which states in pertinent part that "[a] member [of the General
Assembly] shall not be held to answer before any other tribunal for any speech or debate,
written or oral, in either house." ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 12. The court rejected this argument,

maintaining that state laws or constitutions are not applicable to federal criminal cases. 528 F.2d
at 776.
1 528 F.2d at 780. The court utilized the Gravel footnote on waiver to substantiate its

assertion that a senator has the right to waive his legislative privilege. Id.; see Gravel, 408 U.S.
at 622 n.13.
12 See 528 F.2d at 780-81. Whereas the normal voluntary standard of waiver requires a

"knowing and intelligent" waiver of one's rights, the court found that a lesser voluntary standard
could be applied here. Concluding that a fair trial was not at issue, the court asserted that the
legislator's testimony need only be "the 'product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice
by its maker.' " Id. at 781 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)).

113 Id. at 781 (Tone, J.,concurring).
Id. at 784.

114

115 Id. at 782. The concurring judge noted that in addition to supporting official immunity,

the federal speech or debate clause was meant to preserve the separation of powers and maintain equality among the branches of government. In a federal-state relationship, no similar purpose would exist. Id. at 783.
"' United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1976) (en bane).
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three judge panel. 1 17 Thus, the practical effect of. the full court's
decision was to leave unsettled the issue of waiver, subject to a future
court's determination.
The Helstoski case is unique, inasmuch as both the scope of the
legislator's speech or debate privilege, and whether thatprivilege
could be waived, were at issue. In delineating the scope of the legislator's privilege, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit first addressed the issue of whether legislative acts could be
introduced to show Congressman Helstoski's purpose in entering into
the alleged criminal agreement. 11 8 The Government, placing its reliance on Brewster, had urged that the private bills in question, as
well as "correspondence and conversations" referring to Helstoski's
official acts, could be introduced into evidence to prove the purpose
of the bribe. 1 19 The court, however, found that the Government had
misconstrued Brewster, since that case only allowed the prosecution
to show a legislator's purpose for taking a bribe if it could be done
without inquiring into the legislator's official actions. 120 Therefore,
Judge Seitz declared that Helstoski's "[1]egislative acts may not be
shown in evidence for any, purpose in this prosecution." 121
A second aspect of the scope issue before the Helstoski court
required a determination of whether secondary sources, which merely
referred to official acts, fell within the range of protected legislative
activities.' 22 The Government had maintained that conversations and
correspondence referring to prior legislative acts could be shown to
23
prove purpose since they did not constitute actual legislative acts.'
Judge Seitz, however, also rejected this argument and absolutely forbade any reference to Helstoski's official activities through the introduction of secondary materials. 124 Relying upon Brewster once
again, the Helstoski court declared that to permit the introduction of
"such secondary evidence could render Brewster's absolute prohibi' United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d 957, 958 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc).

118576 F.2d at 521; see notes 10 & 19 supra.
119 576 F.2d at 521. The Government criticized the district court's "sweeping reading of
Brewster," and observed that "the Supreme Court [had] recognized that a bribery prosecution
of a member of Congress would of necessity entail reference to legislative acts both past and
present." United States Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3, United States v. Helstoski, 576
F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
120 576 F.2d at 521-22. Judge Seitz reiterated the Brewster guidelines in his opinion. He
noted that "'[i]nquiry into the legislative performance itself is not necessary; evidence of the
Member's knowledge of the alleged briber's illicit reasons for paying the money is sufficient to
carry the case to the jury."' Id. at 522 (quoting Brewster, 408 U.S. at 527).
121 Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
122 Id. at 521-22.
123 Id. at 521.
124 Id. at 522.
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tion meaningless." 125 The court observed that an adaptation of the
Government's position would effectively discourage a congressman
from informing the public about his legislative activities since his
speeches and writings could be used against him should future litigation arise, thus undercutting the protection afforded by article I, sec-

tion 6. 126
While the court cited Brewster, ostensibly relying on the case's
precedential value, it actually construed the privilege in more unqualified terms than had preceding courts by failing to employ the distinction drawn in Brewster between the motive for a legislative act and
the purpose in taking a bribe. 1 27 Had the Heistoski court actually
utilized the Brewster analysis, it could have determined that the
Government was seeking to prove a criminal agreement rather than a
legislative act. 128 Since the taking of a bribe would be deemed a
permissible subject of inquiry under a Brewster rationale, conduct
tending to prove purpose, although casually related to legislative
functions, would not be barred. By formulating that initial distinction,
the court could have logically concluded that reference to Helstoski's
activities, which would otherwise be protected, were admissible as
long as the Government claimed that it sought their introduction
12 9
solely to prove the purpose of the illegal agreement.
The Helstoski court attempted no such categorization, but rather
unequivocally disallowed any inquiry into a legislator's official acts,
125 Id. Consequently, the court refused to sanction a loophole which would have facilitated
circumvention of the speech or debate clause by permitting the introduction of all "nonprivileged evidence" that made reference to any act the Government sought to prove. See id.
126 Id.

127 Compare 576 F.2d at 522 with 408 U.S. at 526-28.
128 See generally 408 U.S. at 526. The factual situations of the two cases are sufficiently
analogous to allow this kind of comparison since both cases involve a United States representative indicted for bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201(1969). See notes 1-2, & 72 supra and accompanying text.
129 Compare 408 U.S. at 526-28 with 576 F.2d at 521-22. See also notes 84-85 supra and
accompanying text. The bribery statute, as interpreted by the Brewster and Helstoski courts,
requires that the Government merely show "the 'corrupt promise for payment, for it is taking
the bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act' under §§ 201(c) and (g)."
576 F.2d at 517 (quoting Brewster, 408 U.S. at 526) (emphasis in original). For the text of 18
U.S.C. § 201(c)(1969), see note 2 supra.
One authority, disagreeing with this interpretation of section 201(c)(1), takes the position
that since the statute mentions "performance" rather than "promise," proof of the former is
actually necessary in establishing a case of bribery. Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege
and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1162 n.243 (1973). Most authorities and
existing case law, however, seem to assume that only proof of a promise is necessary. See 408
U.S. at 526; Note, The Bribed Congressman's Immunity From Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335,
346-47 (1965). For a discussion of a possible solution to the problem of a bribery conviction
based on intent alone, see Note, supra at 347-48.
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regardless of whether that action related to the legislative process or
to the promise to perform an official act in return for compensation. 130 The court's absolute bar, in effect, signified a return to the
pre-BrewsterlGravel standard which simply banned any inquiry into
legislative acts or the motives for such acts. 13 1 By its unqualified
refusal to delve into any official acts, the court rejected the artificial
distinction between one's purpose in taking a bribe and the motiva13 2
tion for performing a legislative act.
Moreover, had the court relied on Brewster and Gravel, it could
have further concluded that Helstoski's letters and conversations
served political or informational functions, thereby falling outside of
constitutionally protected congressional activities.1 33 On this issue as

130 576 F.2d at 522.
131 See 383 U.S. at 184-85.

132 See 408 U.S. at 536 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege
of Speech or Debate: The New Interpretation as a Threat to Legislative Coequality, 8 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 1019, 1045 (1974); Ervin, The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. REV. 175, 189 (1973).
133 The Brewster Court's analysis distinguished legislative from political activities, thereby
explicitly excluding speeches made outside of Congress from the speech or debate clause's protection. Similarly, the Court in Gravel, by disallowing the congressional informing function, had
implicitly deemed outside speeches and privately published copies of legislative speeches to be
non-legislative activities. Compare 408 U.S. at 512 and 408 U.S. at 625, 628 with 576 F.2d at
521-22. See also notes 76-77, 101-03 supra and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court continued to utilize this narrow approach in subsequent cases when
defining the scope of legislative acts. In Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), the Court held
that both subcommittee members and their staff were protected from a civil suit for damages
arising out of the publication of a subcommittee report describing specific instances of disciplinary problems in the Washington, D.C. public school system. 412 U.S. at 308, 312. The plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and their children, had alleged that their rights to privacy were
violated by the report's inclusion of identifiable students in derogatory contexts. Id. at 308 n. 1,
309. The Court, however, was unwilling to extend immunity from private suit to either the
Public Printer of the Government Printing Office or the Superintendent of Documents for the
publication and distribution of the report. Id. at 314. Although authorized by Congress, the
report could not be considered "an essential part of the legislative process and is not part of that
deliberative process 'by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings.'" Id.
at 315 (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625). Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, took exception to the use of the narrow Gravel analysis as applied to the printer, since he considered
informing the public an essential legislative function which ought to receive the protection of
the speech or debate clause. Id. at 328 (Douglas, J., concurring).
In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), the Court determined that a congressional investigation of the respondent organization pursuant to the Internal
Security Act of 1950 fell within the scope of protected legislative activity. 421 U.S. at 504-05.
In the course of an investigation of subversive activities within the United States, the subcommittee issued a subpoena duces tecum to the bank where the Servicemen's Fund had an account, id. at 493-94, whereupon the respondents sought to enjoin implementation of the subpoena as a violation of their first amendment rights, id. at 495. Although the Court found that
the actions of the subcommittee members and Chief Counsel were within the legislative sphere
and thus, were not actionable, id. at 501, the Court again utilized the Gravel criterion in
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well, the Helstoski court deviated from Brewster's and Gravel's narrow distinction between legislative and non-legislative activities by
disallowing the use of any secondary materials as evidence. Although
Judge Seitz did not enumerate all of the activities embraced by the
legislative privilege, he implicitly included the informing function
within the scope of protected acts.1 34 Fundamentally this pronouncement expressed a more realistic appraisal of a legislator's official
responsibilities. As a result, when references are made to legislative
acts in a political speech, in a letter to constituents, or in a conversation with a campaign contributor, they will not be labelled mere
"political activities." 135 The appellate court's opinion recognizes
that
a legislator's activities cannot be neatly categorized, but realistically
must encompass a full range of duties where political and legislative
36
functions often overlap.'
After establishing that the evidence promulgated by the Government constituted legislative activity protected under article I, section 6, the court next had to consider whether the defendant had
effectively waived his privilege, thus allowing for the introduction of
otherwise non-admissible evidence. The issue consequently
raised-whether the speech or debate privilege may be waived as a
result of a defendant's prior testimony about his legislative acts 137
has previously received little judicial analysis.
The Government had urged the court to recognize that the
speech or debate clause creates a personal evidentiary privilege which
could voluntarily be waived by an individual congressman.1 3 8 While

inquiring whether the acts were '"an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes. ... .* Id. at 504 (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625).
134 576 U.S. at 522.
13 See 408 U.S. at 512.
136 In numerous articles written after the Brewster and Gravel decisions, commentators deplored the Court's narrow construction of what constituted legislative acts. The writers main-

tained that the use of a mechanical approach ignored the reality of the modern legislative system, wrongfully excluded the informing function from legislative protection, and demeaned
legitimate acts performed by representatives. See, e.g., Celia, supra note 132, at 1041-85
(1974); Ervin, supra note 132, at 178-91; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 129, at 1149-54.
137 Generally, when privileged communications are voluntarily disclosed, as in the case of
testimony at a trial, a voluntary waiver is deemed to have occurred, since it is "conduct [that]
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY

1356 (3d ed. 1969). For example, since an attorney-client "privilege is designed to secure the
client's confidence in the secrecy of his communications," the privilege would not be violated
but simply waived if the client voluntarily makes disclosures. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2327, at 634 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

138 576 F.2d at 523. In the district court proceeding, the Government relied on Craig, the
only prior case to deal with the issue of waivability, in order to buttress its position that a
voluntary waiver would suffice and indeed had occurred. United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-
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acknowledging that the question of whether a legislator may individually waive his privilege remains unsettled, Judge Seitz indicated that
it was unnecessary to decide the issue at this time. 13 9 With certainty, however, the court went on to hold that there could be no
"finding of waiver in the context of a criminal prosecution except
where the member expressly forfeits his protection under the Clause
....
-140 In analyzing the Government's voluntary waiver theory,
Judge Seitz demonstrated that the legislative privilege could not be
meaningfully analogized to the attorney-client privilege which is designed to protect a client from the disclosure of his private conversations. 14 1 Similarly, any comparison to the fifth amendment's bar on
the use of coerced confessions was rejected since that privilege is

201, slip op. at 9-10 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir.
1978); see note 108 supra and accompanying text. Noting that the waiver issue in Craig had
been rendered moot because of a subsequent reversal of the case on other grounds, Judge
Meanor nevertheless soundly rejected the three judge panel's equating of the legislative and
evidentiary privileges. United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. 11-12 (D.N.J. Feb. 22,
1977 (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978). For a summary of the Craig
panel's reasoning, see notes 140 & 141 infra and accompanying text.
139 576 F.2d at 523. The district court had also found it unnecessary to decide this,issue, but
"assum[ed], without so holding, that the Speech or Debate Clause affords certain rights which
attach to a congressman, as an individual ..
." United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op.
at 11-12 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
140 576 F.2d at 523 (emphasis added).
141 Id. The lower court had engaged in an extensive examination of the nature of the various
privileges on the supposition that an appropriate standard of waiver would follow from a clarification of the character and underlying purpose of a particular privilege. See United States v.
Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 12-16 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd,
576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978). Relying on Professor Wigmore's analysis, Judge Meanor explained
that an evidentiary privilege safeguards the privacy of "confidential communications" between
such parties as husband and wife or attorney and client, a policy deemed worth furthering even
at the expense of the "truth seeking process." Id. at 13. Professor Wigmore had recognized the
"'general liability of every person to give testimony upon all facts inquired of in a court of
justice," 8 J. WICMORE, supra note 137, §2285, at 527, but then qualified this statement by
establishing four conditions which must be present to create an exception of privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal
of litigation.
Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the district court acknowledged that this type of privilege could
be relinquished by a volitional disclosure of the private information to a third party, for this
would constitute "conduct inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the privilege." United
States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 14 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion),
aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).

1978]

NOTES

intended to assure reliable testimony. 14 2 These privileges were
found to differ from the legislative privilege since in neither of the
preceding cases would a voluntary waiver standard serve to weaken
the policies underlying the respective privileges, nor would an ex14 3
press standard tend to advance them.
In articulating the purpose of the speech or debate privilege,
Judge Seitz stressed the importance of preserving the independence
of the legislative process by prohibiting the introduction of legislative
acts into evidence. 144 Only an express waiver standard could effectively obviate "the potential for judicial and executive encroachment
....
"145 Fundamental to the court's result was the conviction that
the disparate ends served by various other privileges must give rise
to dissimilar standards of waiver. Thus, the clause could not logically
establish a personal evidentiary privilege compelling a voluntary
waiver standard. 146 Based on this finding and on the facts of the
case, the court failed to find that Helstoski's prior testimony had met
the stringent waiver standard required by the purposes of the speech
or debate clause. 14 7 The court hypothesized that even if a congressman was able to waive his immunity, the waiver could not be
effectuated by implication, but "must be express and for the specific
purpose for which the evidence of legislative acts is sought to be used
against the member." 148 Applying this analysis, Judge Seitz also re142 576 F.2d at 523. The district court also recognized that the policy of preserving the rights
of a criminal defendant is basic to the fifth amendment and is furthered by disallowing coerced
admissions or confessions. United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip. op. at 14 (D.N.J.
Feb. 22, 1977), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
143 576 F.2d at 523. The district court had also alluded to the inconsistency inherent in both
comparisons. Judge Meanor declared that legislative privilege was neither designed to preserve
confidentiality, nor intended to promote reliable, uncoerced testimony. In fact, the court observed that the preservation of confidentiality would be wholly inconsistent with the policy of
encouraging the free flow of information from a congressman to his constituents-a practice
deemed basic to a representative system of goverment. Moreover, since legislative acts are
generally an indisputable part of the public record, any contention that the privilege promoted
reliability would be unwarranted. The court further noted that it could foresee the absurd situation which would arise if, each time a legislator delivered a speech or sent a newsletter to his
constituents, he did so only at the risk of relinquishing his privilege. United States v. Helstoski,
No. 76-201, slip op. at 14-15 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511
(3d Cir. 1978).
144 576 F,2d at 523.

145 Id. at 523. Judge Meanor had commented that the clause serves the subsidiary purpose of
relieving legislators from the onerous burden of defending themselves in litigation. This benefit,
however, is not intended to aid a member in his private capacity, but rather is designed to
remove an encumbrance which would distract him from official duties. United States v.
Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 13 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576
F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
14 576 F.2d at 523.
147 Id. at 524.
148 Id. at 523-24.
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jected the Government's alternative argument that Helstoski had
satisfied an express standard when he voluntarily testified with full
14 9
knowledge of the potential protection of legislative privilege.
While the court of appeals essentially supported the district
court's holding and reasoning, 150 the greater analytical depth of the
lower court's exploration of the waiver issue warrants a discussion of
that opinion. Judge Meanor's thoughtful and perceptive analysisallowing the purpose of a privilege dictate its means of waivershould effectively have disposed of any future confusion between
legislative and evidentiary privileges.' 5 ' Less elucidating, however,
was the district court's narrow ruling which essentially articulated a
negative standard by outlining those circumstances in which a
15 2
congressman would not be deemed to have waived his privilege.
Although Judge Meanor did propose an express waiver standard
should the privilege be regarded as belonging to the individual, he
never concluded that the right to waive attached solely to a
member. 1 53 Consequently, the criterion advanced by the district
court is contingent upon a finding that the privilege can be individually waived; however, should this question be answered in the negative by a future court, the proposed express standard will become
irrelevant.
Since the district court chose not to ultimately resolve the issue
whether the Congress as a whole or a representative in his individual
capacity possesses the speech or debate privilege, it thus left unresolved the related question of who may waive it. Congressman
Helstoski had posited that the speech or debate clause, properly construed, creates an institutional privilege incapable of ever being
waived by an individual legislator. 154 While Judge Meanor found it
unnecessary to rule on the merits of the defendant's contention, he
articulated two possible conclusions that might emanate from this institutional interpretation.' 5 5 The privilege, if waivable at all, could

149 Id. at 524.
150 See id. at 523-24.

151 United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 12-16 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
152 Id. at 16.

153 Id. Generally, when confronted with a constitutional issue, a court will rule only as narrowly as the case requires. See, e.g., 383 U.S. at 185; Central Hardware Co. v. N.L.R.B., 407
U.S. 539, 549 (1972). In Helstoski, the only issue facing the court was whether a waiver had
actually occurred.
154 United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 11 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished
opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
155 Id. at 11 & n.6.
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be surrendered only by Congress as a body, or, alternatively, "could
be construed as placing a non-waivable constitutional barrier to
a court's receipt of evidence of a [defendant] member's legislative
156
Although the court did not pursue the issue to any
acts ......
conclusion, dicta from earlier cases may illuminate this unsettled
subject area.
The first premise, that Congress pursuant to its power to regulate the conduct of its members could enact a narrowly drawn statute
authorizing the court to inquire into legislative acts, was deliberately
left unresolved in Johnson.157 Several years later, Justice Brennan,
in his dissent, had argued that this was the sole issue then facing the
Brewster Court. 158 He went on to declare that since the Constitution has provided a legislative forum for inquiry into legislative acts
and prohibited questioning "in any other Place,"159 such a statute,
160
whether general or narrow, contravenes the intent of the framers.
Any such assignment to the judiciary of an essentially legislative task
could not be reconciled with the separation of powers doctrine. 1 61 A
similar result is reached if one employs a functional analysis which
questions whether the purpose of the clause would be promoted by
an institutional interpretation of the privilege. In that event, the sanctioning of a congressional transfer of a constitutional prerogative from
the legislative to the judicial branch would irretrievably alter the balance of the federal government and adversely affect the independence
62
of a legislator.1
156

Id.

1'7See

383 U.S. at 185.
158 408 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J.,dissenting). justice Brennan criticized the majority for evading this issue. Id. at 540. He assumed that the indictment required an inquiry, at the very
least, into motives for legislative performance, thereby requiring a determination whether 18
U.S.C. § 201 (1969) was constitutional. Bolstering his assumption was the fact that the Government had "not challenge[d] the applicability of the Clause to these charges," but instead had
maintained that Congress could legitimately enact a narrowly drawn statute waiving legislative
privilege as was done in section 201. Id. at 530. Since this issue was not addressed by the
majority, the question of whether 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1969) is a narrow statute or a statute of
general application remains unresolved. See Note, Speech or Debate Clause Alleged Criminal
Conduct of Congressmen Not Within the Scope of Legislative Immunity. 26 VAND. L. REV. 327,
333 (1973).
159 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
160 See 408 U.S. at 540-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting); notes 3 & 87 supra.
161 408 U.S. at 550.

The often subtle distinction between a criminal act and a proper legislative activity militates against authorizing the judicial branch to inquire into allegations of legislative wrongdoing.
For example, it is not difficult to envision a situation in which a congressman may accept a
campaign contribution from a constitutent while discussing future legislation he plans to introduce in the House that would benefit the people of his district, including the contributing
consitutent. These events could be construed by a member of the executive branch as the
162
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The second possible interpretation is to view the privilege as absolutely non-waivable, either by an individual member or by Congress as a body.16 3 In articulating this position in his brief, Helstoski
believed that the privilege was not only institutional, but that it
effectively created a jurisdictional barrier to prosecution comparable
to exclusive jurisdiction vested in a particular court. 164 This position,
however, is more supportable in its application to the High Court of
Parliament, a body with tribunal origins, than it is to Congress, a
governmental branch whose functions have always been singularly
legislative.165 Alternatively, Judge Meanor suggested that the clause
might be interpreted in the light of its literal wording. 16 6 The prohibition that a member of Congress " 'shall not be questioned in any
other place' " could be viewed as constitutionally precluding a waiver
of any kind. 16 7 Additionally, by employing a functional analysis, a
non-waivable privilege appears to furnish a wider protection than the
speech or debate clause demands. While permitting Congress as a
body to waive its legislative immunity would seriously diminish congressional independence, according an individual member that same
right, consistent with the express standard set forth by the court,

taking of a bribe, resulting in an investigation leading to a criminal indictment of the legislator.
Yet the political-legislative mix of a congressman's job may make it difficult to always distinguish
between a bribe and a campaign contribution. Recognition of this problem lends support to an
interpretation precluding Congress, for example through section 201, from waiving its official
immunity. See id. at 557-58 (White, J., dissenting); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 129, at
1160.
163 United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 11 n.6 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
164 Congressman Helstoski, in his brief to the court of appeals, argued that the speech or
debate clause "establishes not so much a privilege or even immunity from prosecution as a
jurisdictional barrier to calling into question legislative acts in the prohibited forum." Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 2, at 26-27. He went on to assert
that such jurisdiction may be no more yielded by an individual Member than the
jurisdiction of this Court to try matters of which it is exclusively vested could be
transferred to a state court by the will of an individual member of the judiciary.
Id. at 27.
165 For a discussion of the contrast between the English parliamentary privilege and the
American legislative privilege, see notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text. Chief Justice
Burger, emphasizing the differences between the two privileges, concluded that a much narrower interpretation should be afforded the speech or debate privilege. See 408 U.S. at 508,
517-18.
166 United States v. Helstoski, No. 76-201, slip op. at 11 n.6 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1978).
167 Id. Judge Meanor acknowledged that Helstoski's theory was not without constitutional
basis. The judge went on to suggest a literal reading of the clause as an alternative to the
defendant's institutional theory. Id. Acceptance of a literal interpretation would effectively rebut
the argument that Congress could waive the privilege through a narrowly drawn statute.
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should adequately guarantee that a member's actions will not be in68
duced by fear of a hostile executive or judiciary.'
Ultimately, the broad delineation of scope 169 and the high standard of waiver 170 expressed by the Helstoski court underscored its
devotion to the important principles underlying the speech or debate
clause. Cognizant that the purpose of the privilege was to prevent
interference from, and accountability to, another branch of government, 17 1 the Helstoski court undertook an essentially functional
analysis. The court, therefore, sought to interpret scope and waiver in
172
such a manner as to effectively further the purpose of the clause.
Beginning with the premise that a legislator owes a degree of responsiveness solely to his constituents, it becomes evident that the evil
which the clause purports to avoid is that a congressman, motivated
by fear of a hostile executive, would fashion his behavior to the dictates of the other branches of government. To illustrate, a congressman who frequently and vociferously criticizes the administration

168 In addition to protecting a legislator from the results of litigation, legislative privilege also

serves to free him from the burden of having to defend his actions in a courtroom. See Eastland
v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 511 (1975); Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S.
486, 505 (1969).
Granting a representative the sole power to expressly waive his privilege would eliminate
some of the legislator's legitimate apprehensions, for he could than control which legislative
activities could later be used in court against him. The legislator would not have to fear an
inadvertent waiver due to a prior speech or writing, nor need he worry that earlier cooperative
testimony could later be considered a waiver, albeit unsuspecting, and introduced at his own
trial. Thus, the possibility of an unintentional waiver would not be a factor in molding an honest
congressman's legislative behavior. In those cases where a legislator has expressly waived his
privilege, because of remorse over his improper acts or a recognition that the Government has a
strong case against him, his legislative independence would not be compromised or undermined
since the waiver would be voluntarily and knowingly made.
While the Court has never had the occasion to expressly hold that an individual member of
Congress may waive his privilege, some support for this proposition may be found in dicta in
Coffin. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text. Additional substantiation may be found
in Justice Brennan's dissent in Brewster in which he declared that "there is much in the history
of the Clause to point the other way, toward a personalized legislative privilege not subject to
defeasance even by a specific congressional delegation to the courts." 408 U.S. at 547 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). The Gravel footnote stating that a senator may waive his aide's privilege has also
been cited as support for the personal theory of waiver. See United States v. Helstoski, No.
76-201, slip op. at 11 n.6 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 1977) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 576 F.2d 511 (3d
Cir. 1978); notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, a Third Circuit opinion
"recognize[d] the existence of a personal privilege which may be asserted by a legislator in a
federal criminal case to exclude" legislative acts or their motivations but did not find a similar
privilege belonging to "the legislature as an institution .
In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
563 F.2d 577, 585 (3d Cir. 1977).
169 See text accompanying notes 130-32 supra.
170 See text accompanying note 149 supra.
171

172

576 F.2d at 523.
See id. at 522, 523.
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may have reason to fear a Justice Department inquiry. 1 73 This "chilling effect" on congressional freedom would encourage "defensive
legislating," resulting in decreased representational effectiveness and
74
an unbalanced federal structure.1
Frequently unarticulated, yet usually implicit in any speech or
debate clause analysis, is a balancing of competing policies and interests.1 75 While the Brewster Court placed greater emphasis on the
effective prosecution of a senator who has misused the powers of his
office, the Helstoski Court gave more weight to the principle of preserving the separation of powers, even at the cost of an occasional
guilty defendant avoiding prosecution. 176 The article I, section 6 protection envisioned by the Helstoski court would be similar to that
accorded by the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments, which have been
interpreted as affording protections so crucial to an accused that their
177
infringement may act as a bar to conviction.
The substantial policy reasons that moved the framers to insert
legislative privilege within the body of the Constitution ought to provide meaningful guidelines for today's judges who are faced with defining the privilege's boundaries. Shortly, the Supreme Court will decide if the speech or debate clause bars from use at Helstoski's trial
any reference to legislative activity. 1 78 If the Court affirms the Third
Circuit in delineating the controversial evidence as privileged legisla173 Many congressmen, for example, are vulnerable to attack in the area of campaign contributions. It is not impossible to imagine a situation in which a vindictive president, angry at a
particular legislator, would use the machinery of the Justice Department to commence a criminal prosecution.
174 See United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180, 191-92 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 383 U.S. 169
(1966) (fear of inquiry by court may result in legislator unduly self-censoring his right of free
speech so as to behave in unquestionably safe manner); Coffin, 4 Mass. at 27 (immunity exists
for benefit of people so that legislators can perform their duties without fear of prosecution);
Ervin, supra note 132, at 191 (congressional oversight function will suffer unless clause is interpreted liberally to include acquisition and republication of germane material within protected
activities); Comment, Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 125,
146-47 (1973) (narrow interpretation of clause will result in undermining congressional watchdog
role); Note, supra note 158, at 334-35 (inquiry by one branch of government into conduct of
members of co-equal branch impliedly questions their competency and equal standing).
175 See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 525; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 585 (3d Cir.
1977). See also Coffin, 4 Mass. at 28 (balancing of individual's reputation against representative's
freedom to exercise his legislative duties in civil suit).
176 Compare 408 U.S. at 526-28 with 576 F.2d at 522. The framers were aware of the potential for abuse of the privilege, but believed that the risk was necessary in order to promote
legislative independence. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491,
510-11 (1975).
177 See generally 337 F.2d .at 191, aff'd, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). Legislative immunity, in contrast to the Bill of Rights, confers a less complete protection since article I, section 5, provides
for an alternate forum for trying a defendant-legislator. Id. at 191 & n. 18. For the text of article
I, section 5 of the United States Constitution, see note 89 supra.
17' United States v: Helstoski, 47 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S., Dec. 12, 1978) (granting certiorari).
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tive activity, it would then be confronted with formulating an appropriate standard of waiver. 179 Without the use of this evidence, the
Government's case is considerably weakened, perhaps to the extent
that the indictment would have to be dismissed.
While both lower courts employed a broad construction of article
I, section 6 in forbidding from use as evidence all reference to legislative acts, the Supreme Court has several options available dependent
upon its view of the clause. While Brewster may not easily be ignored, strict reliance upon its basic reasoning is likely to result in a
reversal of the Third Circuit's holding. 180 Should the Supreme Court
elect to affirm without disturbing Brewster, it could do so by distinguishing the wording of the Helstoski indictment from the language in
the Brewster charge, although the result would be attained by elevating form over substance. 18 1 Preferably, the Court will simply affirm
by promulgating a forceful statement which embodies a commitment
to absolute legislative independence.
Author's Note:
Priorto publicationof this Note, the United States Supreme Court issued its
opinion in the Helstoski case, United States v. Helstoski, 47 U.S.L.W. 4710 (U.S.
June 18, 1979), affirming the decision of the Third Circuit.
Although the Court, in a separateopinion, refused to dismiss the indictment,
Helstoski v. Meanor, 47 U.S.L.W. 4708 (U.S. June 18, 1979), it held that the
principles underlying the speech or debate clause precluded the introductionof
any reference to Helstoski's past legislative acts at this trial, United States v.
Helstoski, 47 U.S.L.W. at 4713. Assuming, without deciding, that an individual
congressionalmember might waive his legislativeprivilege, Helstoski's actionsand
words failed to meet the "explicit and unequivocal" requirementset out by the
Court. Id. at 4714. Again, assuming that Congress as a body, could waive the
protectionof the clause by statute, the Court held that §201 does not amount to "an
explicit and unequivocal expression" of legislative intent. Id. at 4715.
Suzanne Raymond
179 If the Court were to hold, however, that the evidence in question does not constitute
legislative activity, there would be no need to address the second issue, for non-legislative acts
are not privileged.
'80 Brewster appears to be the controlling case since it is the most recent decision by the
Court in this area. Furthermore, Brewster bears a close factual similarity to Helstoski since both
cases involve bribery indictments under 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1969). See note 128 supra.
161 576 F.2d at 516. In his petition for writ of mandamus, Congressman Helstoski emphasized the differences between the language of the two indictments. Helstoski contended that
since the Brewster indictment had not alleged specific legislative acts on its face, the focus
remained on the agreement. However, because his own indictment had detailed the introduction of particular bills on specific dates for named aliens, the focus had shifted to the acts
themselves. Id. at 516-17.

